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Thierry Burger-Helmchen (France) 
From investment rules of thumb to routines: a real option approach 
Abstract 
This paper examines the role of budgeting and decision tools in the strategizing and decision processes and their effect 
on future routines of the firm. It argues that some conditions must be fulfilled by the decision tools to facilitate the 
change of the firm routines. The reflection is conducted by analyzing the condition of existence of routines. Routines, 
as a redundant pattern of action, are essential units of analysis in the evolutionary approach of the firm and in strategic 
change management. The argument of the work is that for being able to produce new routines a strategic decision – and 
the way this decision is formulated by using budgeting tools – must have as many common characteristics with the 
routines as possible. The principal strategic decision tools we study are scenario analysis and real option. The paper 
concludes that the decision tools can and do influence the routines and the further development capacities of the firm. 
Therefore if the representation of the future development of a firm is dependent on the vision of the manager, this vi-
sion finds a follow-up in the decision tools used.  
Keywords: routines, rules, real option, decision tools, strategic management. 
JEL Classification: D21, L20, M10, M20. 
Introduction
In a recent survey Becker (2004) summarizes the 
main developments of the concept of routine in the 
economic literature. The analysis presented by the 
author on an extensive bibliography covers the theo-
retical and empirical literature on routine over the 
last twenty years. This survey lists the conditions to 
be met for employing the word routine accurately. 
He describes also the effects of routines on organi-
zations and those remaining points in the routine 
theories that are still lacking in development. These 
gaps are considered by Folin and Foss (2004) who 
add an important question that should be answered 
by future research on routines: the question of the 
genesis of routines. This work proposes a possible 
research track by using a particular starting point, 
namely the study of some investment tools in the 
strategic management literature.15
The tasks of managers include the analysis, organiza-
tion and control for the activities of a firm. Many other 
tasks can be added, including forecasting, discovery 
and seizing of opportunities. For example: the finan-
cial evaluation of a project includes, among other 
things, planning the possible developments of the pro-
ject, evaluating the flexibilities and the possible devel-
opments that may occur in the future (of course these 
tasks can be carried out by several individuals, each 
specialized in one of the sub-tasks). The result of this 
evaluation leads to the selection of the future devel-
opment of the firm among alternative courses of action 
and changes. If these techniques of evaluation and of 
implementation of the projects are regularly used, the 
individuals interacting for implementing different sub-
tasks probably develop routines.  
Figure 1 sums up the general idea of this work. Fol-
lowing Nooteboom (2000, p. 184) we suppose that 
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the growth of the firm occurs through a succession 
of exploration and exploitation phases. These phases 
are dependent on the strategic investment decision 
of the firm (right side of the figure) and on the de-
velopment of the routines of the firm (left side of the 
figure). Between these two extremes the organiza-
tional structure of the firm, its operational planning, 
products and services are modified. These succes-
sions of developments influence the strategic change 
capacity of the firm. We focus in this work on the 
lower part of Figure 1: the influence of the decision 
tools and processes on the routines. 
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Fig. 1. Linking routines, resources and decision making 
The decision process we describe starts with an 
existing project, its evaluation and the decision to 
implement it. If it is implemented the project influ-
ences the behavior of the individuals and their rou-
tines. However, projects do not exist as such and 
must first be imagined. Tools of investment creation 
and evaluation exist at the level of a single project 
or at the firm level. Popular tools which have been 
the object of many developments in the last few 
years are scenario analysis and real option (RO). 
Our proposition is that, if these tools are utilized as 
a long-term planning procedure, the repercussion of 
this planning can change the routines in place, and 
eventually create new routines. Several works try to 
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combine different investment tools in such a way as 
to obtain a richer view of the repercussion of in-
vestments, where the opinions of a large part of the 
participants of a firm are taken into account. Frank-
lin (2001, p. 361) notes that the mental models of 
the decision makers shape their action and that the 
budget-planning process is just another type of 
model. We insist in this work on the option planning 
tools. Options can be used in a financial formulation 
or in a more theoretical strategic form (Grundy, 
2004). Franklin (2001, p. 363) pinpoints along with 
other authors that the strategic management litera-
ture could usefully benefit from the search for simi-
larity rather than difference among competing 
schools of thought. To meet this objective Miller 
and Waller (2003) link the scenario analysis and the 
real option approach. The present attempt studies 
the sameness between routine characteristics and 
some decision tools that can influence the future 
creation and utilization of new routines. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following 
manner: first we present some background observa-
tions about routines and summarize the conditions 
that must be met for using the label routine. In a sec-
ond part, we describe some investment evaluation 
techniques that come close to the characteristics high-
lighted by routines. In particular, we show how in-
vestment tools can trigger the development of rou-
tines. A last part concludes and opens up the debate. 
1. Background observations about routines and 
decision making 
Felin and Foss (2004, p. 8) recall some historical 
reasons why routines were introduced in the eco-
nomic literature. A separation from the neoclassical 
literature brought several streams of literature to 
consider routines. The behaviorist literature diverges 
from the neoclassical literature because of the over-
simplistic representation of decision making in the 
organization and Nelson and Winter’s rationale for 
parting from neoclassical literature was the hetero-
geneity ‘imposed’ by the neoclassical point of view. 
Our approach to decision tools and the difference in 
development, interpretation and implementation of 
these tools is close to both of arguments. The notion 
of skill allows Nelson and Winter to introduce rigid-
ity in the behavioral repertoire that is necessary in 
an evolutionary approach, the argument being that 
skilled behavior implies specialization which in turn 
involves reduced flexibility. Unfortunately, there is 
no unique definition of flexibility (De Toni and 
Tonchia, 2005) and the definitions found are very 
context specific, depending on the economic, organiza-
tional, operational or strategic approach considered. 
Flexibility can be broadly seen as the variation of cost 
when a future variation of task must be performed by 
the firm. A strongly entrenched routine corresponds 
to a high cost when change becomes necessary. In 
this perspective the routine limits the search for flexi-
bility. This link between decreasing flexibility and 
the emerging routine process needs to be studied. 
Felin and Foss (2004) suggest the following re-
search steps for obtaining a stronger concept of rou-
tine: first to explain the origins of routines, then to 
introduce a general measure and finally to show 
how routines are linked to the competitive advan-
tage of the firm. We focus in the following on the 
first point: the origin of routines. 
If the flexibility creation process is realized by imple-
menting new routines, or a change of existing routines, 
this process must come close to the condition of exis-
tence of routines. These conditions, that give reality to 
a routine, are listed by Becker (2004) and can be sorted 
out into eight broad categories: routines are (1) pat-
terns, (2) recurrent, (3) operated collectively, (4) can 
correspond to a mindless or effort full task, (5) a proc-
ess, (6) context specific, (7) path dependent, and (8) 
depend on triggers to be activated. 
Routines are a set of behaviors articulated according 
to a recurrent scheme (1). To quote Winter (1954, p. 
263) “a routine is a pattern of behavior that is fol-
lowed repeatedly, but is subject to change if condi-
tions change”. Becker (2004) identifies four types of 
repetition, the repetition of a behaviour, action, ac-
tivity or interaction. Interaction pinpoints the collec-
tive nature of routines distinguishing them from the 
habits that are retained by individuals. (2) The recur-
rence of this interaction shapes a routine. An infre-
quent behavior does not meet the definition of a 
routine. (3) This interaction implies that organiza-
tional routines are not localized in a unique place in 
the firm but are distributed throughout the firm. 
Each individual participating in a precise routine can 
perform a different specific action. The expertise 
developed by each individual leads to a dispersion 
of tacit knowledge across the firm such that only the 
firm as a whole comes to an efficient result. (4) A 
point of disagreement on routine arises on the nature 
of the effort each individual deploys for realizing 
his/her precise task. Is this task realized without 
effort, in a semi-conscious way or conversely with a 
conscious demanding effort? Becker (2004) notices 
that this differentiation matches perfectly the type of 
study performed. A theoretical research describes 
the routine as effortless and an empirical research as 
effortful. (5) Empirical research uses the routine, or 
more precisely the modification of the organiza-
tional routines as an indicator of the process of 
change that modifies the firm. As routines are stable 
patterns, executed effortless, the cognitive resources 
of the individuals are saved and can be engaged in 
the refinement and improvement of routines. This 
improvement fosters change in the organization and 
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routines are an adequate measure of this process. (6) 
The context in which these changes occur is of im-
portance since it impacts the routine. Routines are 
specific to the firm, to its history and the beliefs of 
the interacting individuals (the corporate culture), 
and (7) are path dependent. The triggers of activa-
tion (also related to the switch from one routine to 
another) can be of a different nature depending on 
whether an individual participates in the routine or 
whether an interaction takes place with an individual 
who is not part of the routine. Individuals participat-
ing in the routines can give rise to their modifica-
tions or activation according to their satisfaction 
with the ongoing process. Individuals outside a rou-
tine can trigger it by sending a specific signal. 
The next part explores the relation possibilities be-
tween the implementation of a planning process and 
routines.
2. Evaluation techniques and routines for the 
firm and the decision maker 
A large number of investment tools exist and re-
search in finance and strategic management leads to 
a continuous creation of new tools or the improve-
ment of existing ones (Rigby, 2001). Nonetheless, 
we can provide some broad categorization. As 
shown in Figure 2, two dimensions can be utilized 
to sort out existing tools. 
A first dimension is the quantitative or qualitative 
nature of the tool. The quantitative approach exten-
sively linked to tools coming from the financial 
sphere (option, weighted cost of capital, NPV…) 
uses quantitative information (data) as sole input. 
The data come from previous observations or are 
forecast on the basis of these observations. 
A shift on the horizontal axis corresponds to a quali-
tative improvement, when not only the data are con-
sidered, but also the personal knowledge of the de-
cision makers. In addition, this shift corresponds to 
a change in the origin of the value that fosters the 
investment. For example, at the lower left corner, 
techniques such as real option obtain their value by 
evaluating a possible choice between alternatives 
that already exist. On the right side of the figure this 
alternative does not exist and must first be created 
by the firm. At the extreme right, the capabilities of 
the firm to create alternatives form the value added. 
The second dimension that can be considered is the 
level on which the evaluation and the decision are 
performed. At the micro level, only a single project 
is considered, at the opposite macro level the whole 
firm is impacted.  
Our concern is to study tools that create new situa-
tions that may lead to changes in the firm practices. 
These tools appear on the right side of Figure 2. As 
we will see in the next part, scenario analysis creates 
new situations, or highlights situations that should 
be of concern to the firm. The second tool on which 
we focus, real option, allows a mix of the qualitative 
and quantitative approaches and brings us closer to a 
routine creation procedure. The label heuristic real 
option (HRO) corresponds to the combination of 
scenario analysis and standard real option and is 
related to a trend in the strategic management litera-
ture on real option.  
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Fig. 2. Map of decision tools (adapted from Mun 2002, p. 65) 
2.1. Scenarios. Scenario planning and real option 
are two of the most common tools for evaluating 
projects and developing decisions when faced with 
uncertainty. Scenario planning has been developed 
since many years in strategic management. Originat-
ing in military research, a major early non-military 
utilization of this tool was in the oil industry. Oil 
companies were (and still are) dependent on oil 
stocks, price fluctuations or wars in certain produc-
ing lands. They develop scenarios of what they 
could do, and how they can do it, in case of major 
changes in their industry. This is done by group 
meetings with individuals from different depart-
ments of the firms. Such scenario planning creates a 
blue print of what to do to obtain new routines as 
quickly as possible if previous ones become inade-
quate due to a change in the environment. Recently 
scenario planning is prompting renewed regaining 
interest in the field of strategic management.
In the scenario planning process, stories are built 
relying on existing data, participant beliefs, tacit and 
explicit knowledge. From a broad (almost infinite) 
variety of possible futures, the most likely are se-
lected and thoughtfully studied. The participants try 
to define the reaction of individuals and the envi-
ronment and to define the best behavior to adopt, the 
major risk and possibly the opportunities. In the 
following, we present the steps needed to perform a 
good scenario planning. This presentation is in-
spired by Miller and Waller (2003) who first linked 
scenario definition and real option analysis. 
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a) To define the aim 
The first step of scenario analysis consists in identify-
ing what is expected from this process, what are the 
issues that should be explored and how far the timeline 
considered goes. In general, the scenario conception 
considers long-term horizons. In this step the scope of 
the study is defined, in general scenario planning is 
interesting because it considers the firm as a whole or 
if focused on a sub unit, it considers the influence of 
the sub unit within the firm as a whole. 
b) To identify the participants and the information 
needed
This step corresponds to the formation of the work 
group. Selection of the individuals who have the 
required knowledge for evaluating the situation, and 
beforehand for defining the range of situations to 
which they may be confronted. This work group is 
preferentially transversal to the firm, including indi-
viduals from the different units of the firm directly 
concerned by the aim of the scenario or who can be 
affected by the decision taken. It is at this step, by 
integrating different individuals in a work group, 
that individuals participating in different communi-
ties come together (Cohendet and Llerena, 2003). 
c) To define what is known, what is certain 
At this point, the working group previously selected 
defines the general evolution trends for the whole firm 
and for the different sub-units concerned. A major 
point here concerns the sharing of the tacit knowledge 
of each participant (Nonaka, 1994; Umemoto, 2002). 
d) From certainty to uncertainty (from the known 
to the unknown) 
From the previous step an image arises of what the 
firm is at a specific moment in time and of what it will 
probably be in the future. Then the environment fac-
tors are selected that can significantly blur this picture, 
e.g. the outcomes of the next technology development, 
the behaviors of new entrants, the institutional changes 
that can happen in some countries, market condi-
tions… Once these sources of uncertainty are defined, 
the implications these sources have on the firm, their 
importance (decisive, superficial), location (limited to 
a unit or overall in the firm), must be assessed. 
e) The possible situation and the reactions 
From the formerly defined uncertainty, the best or the 
worse case situation to which the firm can be con-
fronted emerges. If a consensus between the members 
of the work group arises these two extreme situations 
allow the definition of a set of possible reactions, so 
that the reactions are limited to these extremes. 
f) The plausible – inside and outside – reaction to 
the situation 
The plausibility of the functioning of the different 
scenarios after an exogenous shock must be ques-
tioned. In particular the links between the actions 
and the reactions between individuals of the same 
unit, between different units in the firm, and be-
tween the firm and industry. Are these links logical? 
Can such a behavior reasonably be expected from 
the individuals? This step can lead to the elimination 
of several scenarios because many biases can be 
found at this stage. The constructed scenarios can 
reflect the actual circumstances more than credible 
futures. Also, dominant personalities in the working 
group can have a strong influence on the outcomes. 
This is the case when working groups have been set 
up with a too strong connection with existing hierar-
chies (or when one department sends a trainee who 
neglects the importance of scenario building, and 
when in another department the chief is involved). 
g) To devise a strategy 
On the basis of the scenarios conceived, the manag-
ers can determine the actions, the initiatives that 
must be undertaken to transform the routines, the 
structure of the firm in such a way as to be more 
flexible, to be able to give a satisfactory answer 
when one of the exogenous events arises. They 
transform uncertainty partially into risk (nonetheless 
pure uncertainty still exists, corresponding to what 
has not been imagined). This action serves to create 
not only a more flexible structure for responding to 
outside threats, but also a structure more able to 
seize or create opportunities. 
As we have seen above the scenario building ap-
proach does not allow the clear determination of 
when an increase in flexibility leads to an increase 
in the value of the firm. This comes from the non-
quantifiable nature of scenarios. The real option 
perspective focuses on that point. 
2.2. Real options. The real option analysis origi-
nates in the field of financial derivatives and follows 
a development that has recently known an upsurge 
of interest in the strategic management literature. 
The origins of the real option are related to concepts 
of option values, flexibility and firm evaluation. 
Myers (1977) who first used the definition real op-
tion, divides the value of a firm into two categories. 
The first category corresponds to the assets in place 
(tangible or intangible), the second to the opportuni-
ties the firm has for obtaining, in the future, new 
assets at a preferential price.  
The preferential conditions to obtain new assets 
result from the existing assets already in place. The 
label real option, by analogy with the financial op-
tion, stipulates that a firm can buy (or sell) new as-
sets, but is not obliged to do so. The financial option 
determines rights on assets, the real option approach 
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adds to the rights a possibility condition represented 
by the necessity of holding specific resources (tan-
gible-intangible) to be able to exercise an option. 
At the heart of the real option analysis stands the 
asymmetric reaction the firm can have when an 
uncertain situation turns out to be good or bad. Fol-
lowing the financial option logic, the holder of an 
option can acquire specific assets if the environment 
develops favorably, but is compelled to invest if the 
environment develops unfavorably. 
There are many examples of real option applica-
tions, e.g. investment in R&D, evaluation of industry 
extension, joint venture… Many of these analyses 
are carried out in sectors where the intangible assets 
are major components of the total value of the firm. 
When a firm decides for example to change the in-
puts needed for producing an output, or to expand a 
unit of production, some behaviors must be 
changed. Different routines must be employed to 
implement this action. Each type of routine corre-
sponds to a specific endeavor from management to 
change the ongoing activities of the firm. This shift 
in activities corresponds, we assume, to a modifica-
tion of the routines. In each case, it is an initial in-
vestment in flexibility that lowers future costs to be 
supported by the firm when the operations must be 
changed. This initial investment corresponds to the 
cost of setting up the support structure for the modi-
fication of the routines. Similarities can be found 
between the different categories of real option and 
the aim of routines, Table 1 presents some of them. 
Table 1. Real option and corresponding routines 
Type of option Description Corresponding routine 
Option to defer  
(McDonald and Siegel, 1986) 
Management can wait x years to see if output prices justify construction of building 
or developing a plant.  
Time lags and delays (March, 1994) 
Time-to-build option 
staged investment 
(Majd and Pindyck, 1987) 
and
Growth options  
(Kester, 1984) 
Staging investment as a series of outlays creates the option to abandon the 
enterprise in midstream if new information is unfavourable. Each stage can be 
viewed as an option on the value of subsequent stages and valued as a compound 
option. In case of success this option is a growth option. 
(Macpherson A., Jones O., Zhang M., 
2004)
Option to alter 
operating scale, 
e.g. to expand; to 
contract; to shut 
down and restart 
(Trigeorgis and Mason, 1987) 
and 
Option to switch, 
e.g. outputs or inputs 
(Kulatilaka, 1993) 
If market conditions are more favorable than expected, the firm can expand the 
scale of production or accelerate resource utilization. Conversely, if conditions are 
less favorable than expected, it can reduce the scale of operations. In extreme 
cases, production may be halted and restarted. Or if prices or demand changes, 
management can change the output mix of the facility (product flexibility). Alterna-
tively, the same outputs can be produced using different types of inputs 
The speed of executing routines, of 
changing their contents, and of switching 
them (Cohen, 1991) 
Option to abandon 
(Myers and Madj, 1990) 
If market conditions decline severely, management can abandon current opera-
tions permanently and realize the resale value of capital equipment and other 
assets on second-hand markets. 
The speed of decay of routines, the need 
to maintain routines (Cohen, 1991) 
Multiple interacting 
options 
(Trigeorgis, 1996) 
Real-life projects often involve a collection of various options. Upward-potential-
enhancing and downward-protection options are present in combination. They may 
interact with financial flexibility options.  
Frequency and mode of shifting from one 
routine or set of routines to another 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989) 
The major advantages of real option are that it 
evaluates flexibility by building on static tools such 
as the NPV and incorporates managerial decisions 
in the form  of options. This conception limits the 
losses if in the future the situation turns out badly by 
delaying investments in sunk costs. By using the 
mathematical tools of the finance option, this ap-
proach is more rigorous than other qualitative meth-
ods. Also, this model uses time as an input or output 
which makes it possible to determine when the dif-
ferent actions can or should take place.  
Nonetheless, some flaws exist. In general, the real 
options are difficult to evaluate and need unrealistic 
assumptions or guessing some important parameters. 
But, in our view, the major gap is that the real op-
tion only evaluates existing situations and does not 
generate new investment situations or proposals.  
2.3. Heuristic Real Options (HRO), the integrated 
approach. Heuristics are rules of thumb that direct 
the solution approach toward the best solution, but do 
not guarantee that it will be found. More specifically: 
“A heuristic… is a short cut process of reasoning … 
that searches for a satisfactory, rather than an opti-
mal solution. The heuristic, which reduces the time 
spent in the search for the solution of a problem, 
comprises a rule or a computational procedure which 
restricts the number of alternative solutions to a 
problem, based upon the analogous human trial-and-
error process of reaching acceptable solutions to 
problems for which optimising algoriphms are not 
available”, Hinkle and Keuhn (1988; 61).  
For these authors heuristics necessitates a trial and 
error process with feedbacks. In the case of a single 
utilization a heuristic approach is of no use and it is 
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then reduced to a single try. Also the description, 
the available data and the action that can be imple-
mented position the problem into a risk or an uncer-
tain framework. In the case of uncertainty, the heu-
ristic approach is preferable.  
In this integrated approach, the analysis begins by 
scenario building but this time at the level of the 
projects in order to determine which activities are 
subject to the same environmental uncertainties. 
This allows us to determine the risk exposition of 
the activities of the firm in a portfolio-like approach. 
This distinguishes this approach from the majority 
of the real option models which handle options 
separately and try to limit their interaction, mainly 
because this interaction enhances significantly the 
tractability and understanding difficulties of the 
model. The steps are the following: 
a) To elaborate the scenarios 
Ideally, the portfolio of activities should be sorted 
out by routines. This is difficult if not impossible, so 
a grouping by activity is more likely. 
b) To identify exposure to risk 
At this step, environment risks are defined. These 
risks can be at three levels. The most general level is 
the country level, then the industry level and finally, 
the firm level. The country level corresponds to a 
macroeconomic risk, currency exchange rate, the 
industry level corresponds to industry competition: 
the availability of inputs, demand level of the out-
puts, and the firm level corresponds to specific risks 
for each activity, credit risk, pollution, outcomes of 
R&D… Then the effect of each of these risks on 
each of the activities (positive, negative, important, 
negligible) are defined, and by aggregation we can 
deduce the effect of each activity on the whole firm. 
c) To choose the investment guided by real option 
Now that the effect of the uncertainty of the activities 
of the firm is known, the investment must be built as 
a real option, allowing the use of uncertainties in the 
more profitable ways. The cost of developing the 
investment project (the intangibles or tangibles) cor-
responds to the exercise value of the option. 
d) The carrying out 
The final step corresponds to the decision to imple-
ment a scenario, to develop or not assets transversal to 
several activities, assets on which future opportunities 
can be seized or better answers to situations can be 
given. This final step implies the creation of routines. 
The more the conditions needed to have routines are 
set, the easier this last step. This fourth step encom-
passes the monitoring of the relation between the units 
using the same new resources that must be put in 
place, e.g. the financial department of the firm has to 
collaborate with the individuals in charge of financial 
processing in the different other departments. 
The construct of the flexibility, as an expression of 
the improvement of the existing routines or their 
development, becomes concrete when the option is 
exercised or the routines are triggered by an exoge-
nous shock. 
2.4. Links to routines. We adopt the following 
procedure for determining the elements that lead to 
the development of routines. We identified in the 
previously described steps those which reflected the 
condition of existence of the routines. Table 2 
shows the intensity of the link by plus signs. A “+” 
sign corresponds to a significant link of this step on 
the considered characteristics of the routine. A “++” 
sign means that the step determines strongly the 
creation and the characteristics of the routines.  
Table 2. Common characteristics between HRO and routines 
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I (a) Define the aim     
(b) Identify the participants  ++  +   
(c) Define what is known  +     
(d) From certainty to uncertainty  +     
(e) The possible situation  +  ++   
(f) The plausible reaction  +  ++ ++  
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(g) Formulate a strategy   ++  
II (a) Elaborate the scenarios  +     
(b) Identify exposure to risk  +    ++ 
(c) Choice of the investment by RO  +  +  ++ 
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(d) The carrying out  ++  ++  ++ 
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Four characteristics receive a special treatment (pat-
tern, recurrence, effort, process) because the effects 
of these characteristics can be seen only at the end of 
the steps or because all the steps correspond to the 
expression of the characteristic. In this way, the pro-
cedural nature of the routines can only be observed 
when the routine is fully in use. But the first steps of 
the scenario analysis and heuristic real option that we 
have described match the process of change from one 
routine to another by creating the bases of change. 
Individuals involved in such a process, when they 
save on their cognitive resources by using routines in 
their activities, can invest them in the creative and 
demanding work of scenario building. 
The collective nature of the future routine can be 
found in several steps of the planning process. But 
some steps are more dependent than others on the 
interaction between the individuals from the differ-
ent communities because the nature of the work to 
be accomplished in the step depends on the interac-
tion between the individuals. For example, the final 
step, the carrying out of the routine corresponds to 
the practical implementation of a new procedure and 
to the exercise of the option leading to the formation 
of a routine. At this step the real interaction between 
the different individuals takes place and gives its 
effective form to the routine. The identification of 
the participants, and the definition of the plausible 
reaction of the individuals are also steps necessitat-
ing a high interaction and a survey of all the mem-
bers of the firm. Some other steps are collective, 
mainly when the effects and the reactions are deter-
mined and involve the project team. Steps such as 
the definition of the aim and formulation of the 
strategy are rather limited to the top management, 
involving a few individuals only. 
The context dependence and specificity characteris-
ing the routines occur naturally at all the steps of the 
planning. The scenarios are firm specific. But some 
steps correspond to a strong interaction with the fu-
ture routine. Especially the steps where the employ-
ability of the scenario is assessed are context specific. 
Cohendet and Llerena (2003) developed this context 
specificity of the routine. The multiple actors that are 
involved in the routine shaping utilization constitute 
different knowledge creating contexts that compose 
different kinds of communities. These authors inves-
tigate the effects of different forms of communities 
on the routines created. They distinguish hierarchical 
communities as functional groups that are mainly 
employed in our planning procedure from epistemic 
communities and communities of practice. Each 
community influences the routine emergence in such 
a way that the results diverge in terms of search po-
tential, inertia and replication facility. 
Closely connected to this preoccupation is the path 
dependence of routines. The path dependence appears 
in the way the history of the firm (chronology of the 
evolution) leads to the utilization and actual form of 
the routine. This is recognized in theoretical and em-
pirical works. Teece et al. (1997, p. 522) in a theo-
retical work note that “…a firm’s previous invest-
ments and its repertoire of routines (its ‘history’)
constrain its future behaviour”. Betsch et al. (2001), 
in an empirical work related to investment decision, 
design an experiment where players have to define an 
aim, determine a strategy and perform investment 
strategies. The result shows that the players are 
strongly path dependent when their previous decision 
was successful and they omit in this case new infor-
mation and stand close to the established scenario. 
The extension of the scenario analysis with real op-
tion becomes significant when we consider path de-
pendence with uncertainty in the steps of the strategy 
formulation (Step Ig, IIa, b, c). Courtney et al. (1997) 
show that the path dependence is lower when the 
uncertainty and the pace of change increase. In case 
of absence of uncertainty and a slow continuous 
change, these authors characterize the future as clear 
with a single future path directly linked to the previ-
ous position of the firm. When uncertainty increases 
the future paths become numerous and the links with 
the previous positions (routines) become discontinu-
ous or break. The path dependence fades when too 
many parameters are changed simultaneously and the 
previous routines become useless. 
The triggers of a routine that are precise stimuli, 
internal or external to the firm, can be partially 
found in the analysis of the plausibility of the reac-
tion. Thus, the reactions of the individuals after a 
shock may lead to the establishment of a recurrent 
behavior (conform or not to the expectation formu-
lated). For example, the introduction of a tool for 
the fabrication of a standard pizza in different fran-
chised stores is studied by Argote and Darr (2000). 
The new tool was either accepted or rejected by 
local managers of pizza shops and led to different 
routines in the pizza fabrication process. In case of 
acceptance, it corresponded to an application of the 
“scenario” intended by the franchise group.
The real option addition becomes of crucial impor-
tance when we consider triggers of routines. In con-
ventional scenario analysis no threshold is given for 
putting the plan into practice. The addition of real 
option makes it possible to determine such thresholds 
quantitatively. These thresholds can be dependent on 
events external or internal to the firm. McGrath 
(1999) gives examples of internal thresholds in the 
form of manager’s satisfaction level depending on 
previous success or failure in investment projects. 
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Her conclusion is that a real option approach lowers 
the threshold if it exists, or creates thresholds that 
foster the decision making process of the managers. 
The managers considering real options are favorable 
to change and the development of new routines in the 
firm. She mentions as a potential threat, when the 
options are not considered, that the firm rests on the 
utilization of a routine that proved its effectiveness in 
previous situations but shows reluctance to searching 
and developing new routines.  
Conclusion 
This work tries to tie together different approaches 
for linking real option decision making to routines 
and to see their effect on the firm. We first described 
the basic characteristics of a routine and, in the sec-
ond part, we linked these characteristics to a sce-
nario planning procedure. This endeavor shows that 
careful planning, using scenarios and real option 
meets several conditions of existence of routines. 
We can assume that such planning allows a better 
understanding of a firm investment and its effects on 
the organization. In addition, it prepares the firm to 
a modification of the existing routines. 
In the third part we discussed some studies, using 
different methodologies, about the effects of real 
option and their links with the routines of a firm. 
We formulate the assumption that, even if theoreti-
cally the real option shows better results, its utilisa-
tion is difficult from a practical point of view.  
As pinpointed by Dosi et al. (2000) “routines carve 
a crucially important aspect of knowledge right at it 
joints, namely, its application”. We see that the 
practical aspect of routines limits the theoretical 
qualities of real option.
Of course the unique culture of each company, the 
specific circumstances it is facing influence its strate-
gies and strategic planning process requirements. The 
culture of the organization affects the content of the 
changes recommended as well as how the changes are 
communicated (Bloodgood, 2000, p. 246). Therefore 
each decision tool influences more or less directly the 
organization and the routines of the firms (and recipro-
cally). In this work we try to give a general overview 
of how routines and real option are linked. 
Palmer and Dunford (2002) proposed an image of 
change management, focusing on two dimensions, 
namely whether the outcome was intended or not, 
and whether the management had a controlling activ-
ity or rather a shaping activity. They conclude that 
where management is viewed as shaping capabilities 
it might be accepted that transformation might be 
managed but there will be variable answers in terms 
of the extent to which change outcomes are intention-
ally achieved. Smith and Graetz (2006), in a study of 
organization forms, conclude that change is continu-
ous at the micro level but discontinuous at the macro 
level. Therefore the relations between organizing and 
strategizing could be non-linear and recursive. Based 
on our Figure 1, the continuous change at the micro 
level happens at two points, on the decision behavior 
of the manager (including the decision tools used) 
and on the routines. These two micro elements of the 
firm should change, or rather co-evolve in an inte-
grated manner to achieve a better growth perform-
ance at the macro level. In an empirical work 
Bloodgood (2006) showed that this is particularly 
true for big firms who need to focus more on change 
motivation within their organization. However these 
points deserve further research to clarify the links 
between routines and strategic decision making. 
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